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FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of 
Financial Regulation 
Douglas W. Arner*, Jànos Barberis** & Ross P. Buckley*** 
Abstract: Regulatory change and technological developments following the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis are changing the nature of financial markets, services, and 
institutions. At the juncture of these phenomena lies regulatory technology or 
“RegTech”—the use of technology, particularly information technology, in the context 
of regulatory monitoring, reporting, and compliance. 
Regulating rapidly transforming financial systems requires increasing the use of and 
reliance on RegTech. Whilst the principal regulatory objectives (e.g., financial stability, 
prudential safety and soundness, consumer protection and market integrity, and market 
competition and development) remain, their means of application are increasingly 
inadequate. RegTech developments are leading towards a paradigm shift necessitating 
the reconceptualization of financial regulation. 
RegTech to date has focused on the digitization of manual reporting and compliance 
processes. This offers tremendous cost savings to the financial services industry and 
regulators. However, the potential of RegTech is far greater – it has the potential to 
enable a nearly real-time and proportionate regulatory regime that identifies and 
addresses risk while facilitating more efficient regulatory compliance. 
We argue that the transformative nature of technology will only be captured by a new 
approach at the nexus of data, digital identity, and regulation. This paper seeks to 
expose the inadequacy of digitizing analogue processes in a digital financial world, sets 
the foundation for a practical understanding of RegTech, and proposes sequenced 
reforms that could benefit regulators, industry, and entrepreneurs in the financial sector 
and other industries. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
I have a dream. It is futuristic, but realistic. It involves a Star Trek 
chair and a bank of monitors. It would involve tracking the global flow 
of funds in close to real time (from a Star Trek chair using a bank of 
monitors), in much the same way as happens with global weather 
systems and global internet traffic. Its centerpiece would be a global 
map of financial flows, charting spill-overs and correlations.1 
 
      -Andy Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of England (2014) 
 
Regulatory and technological developments are changing the nature of 
financial markets, services, and institutions in ways completely unexpected 
prior to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which we have addressed in 
previous work.2 “FinTech” refers to the use of technology to deliver financial 
solutions and is one aspect of these fundamental changes. The rapid evolution 
and development of FinTech demands a similar evolution and development 
of “RegTech.”3 RegTech is a contraction of the terms regulatory and 
technology, and it comprises the use of technology, particularly information 
technology (IT), in the context of regulatory monitoring, reporting, and 
compliance. In the words of Christophe Chazot, HSBC Group Head of 
Innovation, RegTech can be described as “technological solutions to 
regulatory processes.”4 The automation of processes allows for better and 
more efficient risk identification and regulatory compliance than that which 
currently exists.5 The recent deal by which IBM is to acquire Promontory 
Financial Group heralds the way forward. The synergies in the deal come 
from the 600 risk and compliance consultants within Promontory teaching 
Watson, IBM’s huge artificial intelligence system, how to apply AI to risk 
management and compliance obligations.6 
 
 1  Andy Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Maxwell Fry Annual Global Finance 
Lecture: Managing Global Finance as a System, Birmingham University 10 (Oct. 29, 2014) (transcript 
available online on the Bank of England website). 
 2  See Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-
Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 1271, 1272-1319 (2016); ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS 
W. ARNER, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE 
(2011). 
 3  See infra Part C.III of this article; see also INST. OF INT’L FIN., REGTECH IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS FOR COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING 5-8 (March 2016). 
 4  INST. OF INT’L FIN., REGTECH: EXPLORING SOLUTIONS FOR REGULATORY CHALLENGES 2 (Oct. 
2015). 
 5  See SANTIAGO FERNANDEZ DE LIS, ET AL., REGTECH, THE NEW MAGIC WORD IN FINTECH 1 
(March 2016). 
 6  Penny Crossman, IBM Buying Promontory Clinches It: Regtech is Real, AMERICAN BANKER (Sept. 
29, 2016, 4:42 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ibm-buying-promontory-clinches-it-
regtech-is-real.   
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Our vision builds on that of Andy Haldane, whereby financial 
institutions and regulators monitor and analyze real-time financial 
information from all parts of the global financial sector to underpin a safer 
and more efficient financial system.7 
Of late, two painful pressure points have come to bear on the financial 
services industry and support our vision. On the expense side, postcrisis fines 
have exceeded US$200 billion,8 and the ongoing cost of regulation and 
compliance has become a primary concern industry-wide.9 On the revenue 
side, competition from FinTech companies is expected to put US$4.7 trillion 
of revenues at risk.10 These expense and revenue factors are driving the 
development of RegTech. As with FinTech,11 the 2008 GFC represented a 
turning point in the development of RegTech.12 However, the factors 
underlying, and the beneficiaries of, RegTech are quite different. FinTech 
growth has been led by start-ups (now increasingly partnering with, or being 
acquired by, banks and other traditional financial institutions),13 whilst 
RegTech developments to date are primarily a response to the huge costs of 
complying with new institutional demands by regulators and policy makers.14 
For the financial services industry, the cost of regulatory obligations has 
dramatically increased, such that 87% of banking CEOs in one survey 
 
 7  See Haldane, supra note 1. The idea of using technologies to carry out real-time monitoring of 
financial institutions and markets is also promoted by some academics and practitioners. See, e.g., Stefano 
Battiston, et al., Complexity Theory and Financial Regulation, 351 SCIENCE 818, 819 (2016) (advocating 
that “[o]ne ambitious option would be an online, financial-economic dashboard that integrates data, 
methods, and indicators. This might monitor and stress-test the global socioeconomic and financial system 
in something close to real time, in a way similar to what is done with other complex systems, such as 
weather systems or social networks.”). 
 8  See Jeff Cox, Misbehaving banks have now paid $204B in fines, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2015, 1:58 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/30/misbehaving-banks-have-now-paid-204b-in-fines.html. 
 9  See Thomson Reuters Annual Cost of Compliance Survey Shows Regulatory Fatigue, Resource 
Challenges and Personal Liability to Increase throughout 2015, THOMSON REUTERS (May 13, 2015), 
http://thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2015/05/cost-of-compliance-survey-shows-regulatory-
fatigue-resource-challenges-personal-liability-to-increase.html. 
 10  See The Fintech Revolution, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
leaders/21650546-wave-startups-changing-financefor-better-fintech-revolution. 
 11  Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2. 
 12  See INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 4, at 1 (observing that “[t]he financial 
crisis of 2008-09 sparked an unprecedented regulatory response across the globe. . . . The new reforms 
have dramatically increased challenges and costs for the financial sector related to compliance, reporting 
and supervisory requests.”). 
 13  See Banks Rushing to Collaborate with FinTech Startups, FINEXTRA (Sep. 16, 2016), 
https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/29443/banks-rushing-to-collaborate-with-fintech-startups; EY, 
FINTECH: ARE BANKS RESPONDING APPROPRIATELY? (2015); Andrew Meola, 1 in 5 European Banks 
Would Buy FinTech Startups, BUS. INSIDER (July 17, 2016, 11:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider 
.com/1-in-5-european-banks-would-buy-fintech-startups-2016-6/?r=AU&IR=T.  
 14  See Gregory Roberts, FinTech Spawns RegTech to Automate Compliance, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/enterprise/blog/fintech-spawns-regtech-automate-compliance-
regulations/. 
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considered these costs as a source of disruption.15 This provides a strong 
economic incentive for more efficient reporting and compliance systems to 
better control risks and reduce compliance costs. Furthermore, the massive 
increases in the volume and types of data that have to be reported to 
regulatory authorities16 represent a major opportunity for the automation of 
compliance and monitoring processes. For the financial services industry, the 
application of technology to regulation and compliance has the scope to 
massively increase efficiency and achieve better outcomes. 
For regulators, RegTech provides the means to move towards a 
proportionate risk-based approach where access to and management of data 
enables more granular and effective supervision of markets and market 
participants.17 This provides the opportunity to minimize the risks of the 
regulatory capture witnessed in the run-up to the 2008 GFC18 as well as being 
a natural response to the increasingly digital nature of global finance.19 
Furthermore, applying technology to regulation facilitates the monitoring of 
financial market participants who are becoming increasingly fragmented by 
the emergence of new FinTech start-ups.20 
Enhanced reporting accuracy and decreased compliance costs are not 
new incentives.21 However, as the financial services industry becomes 
increasingly digitized, the gap between the accuracy and costs of manual and 
automatic compliance and monitoring is widening. Combined with recent 
advances in data science and analytics, RegTech’s growth can be understood 
 
 15  FERNANDEZ DE LIS, ET AL., supra note 5, at 1. 
 16  For a comprehensive summary of the various reporting requirements imposed by post-Crisis 
regulatory reforms, see INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 3, at 5–8. 
 17  See IMRAN GULAMHUSEINWALA ET AL., INNOVATING WITH REGTECH - TURNING REGULATORY 
COMPLIANCE INTO A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 10 (2015) (observing that the development of RegTech 
will eventually lead financial supervision to a “Compliance by Design” framework which enables 
automated monitoring of compliance standard by the regulators.).   
 18  The argument is that if regulators are able directly to access financial data from supervised firms, 
this will allow them to form their own evidence-based opinion on the state of the company as opposed to 
rely on the company’s reporting. Similarly, as the amount of data available to regulators increases, their 
policy decisions and the impact they have on financial markets may be simulated to more accurately 
predict consequences as opposed to relying on market participants’ self-serving opinions. 
 19  See Douglas Arner & Janos Barberis, FinTech in China: From The Shadow?, 3 J. FIN. 
PERSPECTIVES 23 (2015). 
 20  GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION, G20 HIGH-LEVEL PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION 12 (2016) (highlighting key action plans that “encourage the use of digital 
technologies, as appropriate, to improve their processes and capacity for supervision.”). 
 21  For example, JP Morgan spent a combined US$600 million on regulatory and control technology 
in 2015. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 4, at 1. According to Thomson Reuters’s 
Annual Cost of Compliance Survey, “[m]ore than two-thirds of firms (68 percent) are expecting an 
increase in their compliance budget this year (2015) with 19 percent expecting significantly more. G-
SIFIs are expecting a noticeably greater increase in compliance team budgets with one third (33 percent) 
expecting significantly higher budget.” Thomson Reuters Annual Cost of Compliance Survey Shows 
Regulatory Fatigue, Resource Challenges and Personal Liability to Increase Throughout 2015, supra 
note 9. 
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as process automation to substantially decrease both compliance costs as well 
as the potential for regulatory actions and fines.22 
Regulation today is benefiting from the automation of reporting and 
compliance processes. This trend is beginning to enable substantial cost 
savings for industry and superior monitoring by regulators, such that the early 
signs of real-time and proportionate regulatory regimes that identify risks and 
enable more efficient regulatory compliance are beginning to emerge.23 
However, the automation and streamlining of regulatory processes is only an 
incremental evolution toward a better and more efficient regulatory 
framework. 
In this paper, we seek to analyze the rise of RegTech to aid the 
understanding of regulators, industry, and the entrepreneurial community. 
We argue that RegTech developments are at present incremental, but that we 
are ultimately moving towards a paradigm shift that will necessitate a 
reconceptualization of financial regulation. 
We argue that the transformative potential of technology will only be 
fully captured by a new and different regulatory framework situated at the 
nexus of data and digital identity. The developments in FinTech, the 
tremendous changes in emerging markets, and the recent pro-active stance of 
regulators (for instance with the development of regulatory sandboxes) may 
potentially combine to facilitate a transition from one regulatory model to 
another.24 This paper sets out to provide a conceptual foundation for RegTech 
and to craft a very rough roadmap that could serve to guide such a transition. 
Following this introduction, Part II considers the evolution of RegTech, 
so as to provide a framework of analysis for the remainder of the paper. Part 
III considers the first element of this framework, namely the use of 
technology by financial institutions and the financial industry to meet 
regulatory requirements, particularly those resulting from reforms in the 
wake of the 2008 GFC. Part IV discusses the technology used by regulators, 
regulators’ historical relationship with the industry, technological 
developments, and the challenges for regulators of the postcrisis 
environment. Part V considers the new challenges of FinTech and the need 
for RegTech in meeting them. Part VI concludes. 
 
 22  DELOITTE, REGTECH IS THE NEW FINTECH: HOW AGILE REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY IS HELPING 
FIRMS BETTER UNDERSTAND AND MANAGE THEIR RISKS 4 (2015). 
 23  For example, in the area of payments transactions monitoring, the IIF observes that “[b]anks both 
conduct post-facto checks on transactions (taking data inputs from loans, money market, payments and 
interbank systems), and monitor, flag and block or report illegal transactions in real-time.” INSTITUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 3, at 9. 
 24  Currently there are at least four jurisdictions consulting on (and implementing) this new regulatory 
approach of the regulatory sandbox. They are the UK, Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong. See, e.g., 
Australian Securities & Investments Commission, 16-129MR Innovation Hub: Regulatory Sandbox 
Proposal, ASIC (May 4, 2016), http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2016-
releases/16-129mr-innovation-hub-regulatory-sandbox-proposal/. 
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 II. REGTECH: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
As noted at the outset, regulatory and technological developments over 
the past decade have changed the nature of financial services and financial 
institutions in ways quite unexpected prior to the 2008 GFC. We turn first to 
the intentional aspect of this change: postcrisis regulation. Subsequently we 
consider the digital transformation in developed countries and the growth in 
digital financial services in developing countries; and then move on to 
consider the rise and roles of FinTech startups and RegTech. 
 A. Postcrisis Regulation 
The 2008 crisis and resulting postcrisis financial regulatory reforms 
have transformed the way in which financial institutions operate, combining 
to reduce their risk-taking, the spectrum of their operations, and their 
profitability.25 The mass of new postcrisis regulation has dramatically 
increased the compliance burden on financial institutions, in addition to the 
direct cost of regulatory penalties (over $200 billion globally since the 
crisis).26 
These changes were the intent of the postcrisis regulatory reform 
agenda.27 In previous work, we (and many others) have analyzed in great 
detail the development, implementation, evolution, and effectiveness of 
postcrisis regulatory reforms and their implications.28 This new regulatory 
environment is one of the major drivers leading to the emergence of 
RegTech; we return to this issue in Part III. 
 B. FinTech 
With this dramatically altered regulatory, operating, and compliance 
environment has also come the rapid evolution of technology and its 
application to finance, namely FinTech. While FinTech as a term has only 
risen to prominence in the past three years,29 the interaction between finance 
and technology has a long history, one that we (and increasingly others) have 
analyzed.30 
 
 25  For a brief overview of the postcrisis global mandated reforms and the profound changes in global 
finance over the past 40 years, see Ross P. Buckley, Reconceptualizing the Regulation of Global Finance, 
36 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 242 (2016).  
 26  See Cox, supra note 8. 
 27  See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE G20 FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORMS: REPORT TO THE G20 (Aug. 2016). 
 28  See BUCKLEY & ARNER, supra note 2; RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS 
REGULATION (Ross P. Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas & Douglas W. Arner eds., 2016). 
 29  See Fintech: Interest over Time, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://www.google.com/trends/ 
explore#q=fintech (accessed Sep. 19, 2016). 
 30  See Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2; Andrew Lo, Moore’s Law vs. Murphy’s Law in the 
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Today’s FinTech landscape is the result of three major evolutionary 
trends – impacting traditional financial services in global markets, 
developing countries, and FinTech start-ups.31 
 1. Digital transformation in developed markets 
In the developed world the transition from an analogue to a digital 
financial industry started to occur in the late 1960s with the emergence of the 
handheld financial calculator and the ATM.32 This was followed by decades 
of increasingly rapid technological change leading up to the latest decade of 
extraordinarily swift technological developments. While change has been 
pervasive, particularly in wholesale institutional markets, two areas highlight 
the scale of transformation: first, payments, and second, securities markets. 
While electronic payment systems date back to the time immediately 
following the invention of the telegraph, the most important developments 
have occurred since the early 1970s, with electronic payment systems in 
developed markets and cross-border payment systems such as SWIFT 
(Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications)33 and 
VISA,34 the establishment of RTGS (real time gross settlement systems) in 
the 1980s and 1990s,35 and the creation of CLS (Continuous Linked 
Settlement),36 culminating in today’s $5.1 trillion-a-day global foreign 
exchange markets.37 
This multidecade process took place through a carefully developed 
partnership between major central banks and financial institutions, targeted 
 
Financial System: Who’s Winning? (Bank for International Settlement, Working Paper No. 564, May 
2016). 
 31  Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2. 
 32  Anuli Akanegbu & Ricky Ribelro, Calculating Firsts: A Visual History of Calculators, EDTECH 
MAGAZINE (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/2012/11/calculating-firsts-
visual-history-calculators; Brian Milligan, The Man Who Invented the Cash Machine, BBC NEWS (June 
25, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6230194.stm. 
 33  SWIFT was founded in the 1970s. SWIFT History, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/about-
us/history. 
 34  VISA was launched in 1958. History of Visa: Our Journey, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/about-
visa/our_business/history-of-visa.html. 
 35  See PETER ALLSOPP, BRUCE SUMMERS & JOHN VEALE, THE EVOLUTION OF REAL-TIME GROSS 
SETTLEMENT: ACCESS, LIQUIDITY AND CREDIT, AND PRICING (Feb. 2009). For a more recent example in 
developing countries like Zambia, see The Zambian Interbank Payment and Settlement System (ZIPSS), 
BANK OF ZAMBIA, http://www.boz.zm/zipss.htm. 
 36  See JÜRG MÄGERLE & DAVID MAURER, THE CONTINUOUS LINKED SETTLEMENT FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (CLS) (2009), http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/ 
continuous_linked_settlement/source/continuous_linked_settlement.en.pdf. 
 37  See Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and OTC Derivatives Markets in 2016, 
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (last updated Sep. 1, 2016), http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
rpfx16.htm; Reuters, Forex Volumes in June Hit Above $5 Trillion a Day, FORTUNE (July 14, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/07/14/forex-volumes-june-brexit/. 
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at both supporting economic and financial globalization, and reducing the 
serious risks inherent in cross-border payments, particularly systemic risks.38 
This is an important example of precrisis RegTech as well as in the evolution 
of FinTech.39 
In addition – and importantly from the standpoint of other major trends 
– this global payments infrastructure also provided the basis for the rise of 
alternative payment systems such as PayPal and AliPay.40 
In the context of securities markets, since the early 1970s, markets have 
transformed from 19th century paper-based physical systems to today’s 
virtual electronic markets, characterized by high frequency and algorithmic 
trading: the world of the “flash boys.”41 This trend began in 1971 with the 
establishment of NASDAQ, the first fully electronic securities market,42 with 
major consequences including the 1987 stock market crash (program 
trading), the dot.com bubble and collapse in 2001, and the flash crash of 
2010. Once again, this transformation arose from an interaction between 
major market participants and regulators, focused on improving efficiency 
and risk management while seeking to control risks to investors and 
markets.43 This interaction can be seen in the context of the National Market 
System (NMS) in the United States and the Investment Services Directive 
(ISD), Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) in the EU. Today, of course, the 
majority of securities trading involves computers trading with each other, 
with humans as minority participants who almost never interact outside the 
electronic environment.44 
 
 38  For example, they attempted to reduce risks like Herstatt risk (cross-currency settlement risk). The 
Long, Dark Shadow of Herstatt, THE ECONOMIST (April 12, 2001), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/574236. 
 39  For example, the IIF highlights in its RegTech Report that “[n]ear real-time settlement could be 
achieved through automation and global consensus on the blockchain. These capabilities could automate 
compliance aspects in use cases including cross-border payments, syndicated loans, and repo markets.” 
Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 15.   
 40  See Henry Helgeson, How China and Kenya are Winning the Payment Wars – and Why the US 
Should Worry, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2014/08/18/how-china-
and-kenya-are-winning-the-payment-wars-and-why-the-u-s-should-worry/#1503b8c56241. 
 41  See MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (1st ed., 2015). 
 42  Nasdaq’s Story, NASDAQ, http://business.nasdaq.com/discover/nasdaq-story. 
 43  For a brief but comprehensive summary of the role of regulators and regulations in the 
development of electronic markets and high frequency trading, see ANUJ AGARWAL, HIGH FREQUENCY 
TRADING: EVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, CAPGEMINI, at 19–20 (2012). 
 44  Trading is now dominated by high-frequency and computerized trading. Bradley Hope, 5 Things 
to Know about High-Frequency Trading, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 2, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
briefly/2014/04/02/5-things-to-know-about-high-frequency-trading/. The Financial Times also reports 
that “[h]uman investment managers are at risk of being rendered obsolete by rapid advances in algorithmic 
trading technology.” Miles Johnson, Human Investment Managers Risk Obsolescence, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 
25, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/17129fc0-a48c-11e4-8959-00144feab7de.html#axzz 
4KHL25EFp. 
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 2. Digital financial services in developing countries 
Finance for economic development has long been an important focus 
for policy makers seeking to support growth in developing countries.45 The 
emergence of the mobile telephone in the 1980s and its rapid expansion in 
developing countries from the 1990s set the stage for one of the most 
important developmental transformations: the emergence of digital financial 
services (DFS). 
DFS are based on the idea of using mobile telephones or other digital 
platforms to increase access to finance.46 This is a response to the 
infrastructure gap that arises when mobile penetration is high, but physical 
banking infrastructure (and thus financial inclusion) is very low, meaning 
DFS are the most efficient delivery mechanism for financial products and 
services. At the first level, the rapid adoption of mobile telephones across 
large populations previously without access to communications technology 
provided the necessary infrastructure. Once mobile phones became widely 
used and available, network effects combined with unmet demand (in this 
case for financial services) provided the opportunity to use the new, widely 
available technology to provide access to financial services. The result has 
been (particularly in parts of Africa) a real success story of increasing 
financial inclusion and economic growth.47 
Unlike the digitization of developed country wholesale and institutional 
markets, in general DFS in most developing countries has developed 
independently of the efforts of financial regulators, and it was usually led by 
mobile telecommunications companies.48 In many cases, financial regulators 
only began addressing potential risks to consumers and financial stability 
once mobile payments had already become of major importance in the 
domestic financial system. 
 
 45  See DOUGLAS ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
(2007). 
 46  This idea is also known as “digital financial inclusion” which “refers broadly to the use of digital 
financial services to advance financial inclusion. It involves the deployment of digital means to reach 
financially excluded and underserved populations with a range of formal financial services suited to their 
needs, delivered responsibly at a cost affordable to customers and sustainable for providers.” GLOBAL 
PARTNERSHIP FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION, GLOBAL STANDARD-SETTING BODIES AND FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION: THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE 46 (March 2016). 
 47  See e.g., BANK OF ZAMBIA, FINSCOPE ZAMBIA 2015 1 (2015). 
 48  See Financial Services in Africa, KPMG 4 (2013), https://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/ 
IssuesAndInsights/Articles-Publications/Documents/KPMG%20Financial%20Services%20in%20 
Africa.pdf; Daniel Runde, M-Pesa And The Rise Of The Global Mobile Money Market, FORBES (Aug. 12, 
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/08/12/m-pesa-and-the-rise-of-the-global-mobile-
money-market/. 
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 3. FinTech start-ups 
The third major element, and the one that typically receives the most 
press attention today, has been the emergence of new entrants, often start-
ups, focused on combining new technology and finance for the benefit of 
consumers. While successful FinTech start-ups are by no means new (e.g. 
Bloomberg in the 1980s and PayPal in the late 1990s), their numbers and 
profile have increased dramatically since 2008. This is reflected in the rise of 
the noun “FinTech” (meaning a new start-up company applying technology 
to finance). While the focus is often on alternative financial techniques such 
as crowdfunding, P2P (peer to peer) lending and robo-advisory services, in 
fact, this trend also embraces established IT and ecommerce firms (such as 
IBM, Tata, Apple, Amazon, and Alibaba) and  new start-ups, all applying 
technology to address challenges and create opportunities across the financial 
sector. 
Today, FinTech impacts every area of the financial system in virtually 
every part of the world, with the most dramatic impact perhaps in China, 
where technology firms such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent (BATs) have 
transformed finance and raised new challenges for regulators and 
regulation.49 Furthermore, since 2016 regulators in a range of countries 
including the United States, Australia, Singapore, and the UK have been 
actively engaged in better understanding FinTech market dynamics and 
seeking to develop new regulatory approaches.50 
 C. RegTech 
Unlike the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), we argue that 
RegTech cannot be simplified as a category of FinTech. According to the 
FCA: “RegTech is a sub-set of FinTech that focuses on technologies that may 
facilitate the delivery of regulatory requirements more efficiently and 
effectively than existing capabilities.”51 This is a pragmatic assessment of 
where RegTech is today, but it is made from an overly narrow perspective. 
In our view, this definition lacks vision as to the true potential of 
 
 49  See Weihuan Zhou, Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Regulation of Digital Financial 
Services in China: Last Mover Advantage, 8 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 25 (2015); Arner & Barberis, 
supra note 19. 
 50  For example, the rationale behind the launch of regulatory sandboxes in the UK, Australia, and 
Singapore is that regulators will then be able to support innovation in financial services by collaborating 
with industry to better understand FinTech market dynamics. See ASIC, Fintech: ASIC’s Approach and 
Regulatory Issues 10–12 (Paper submitted to the 21st Melbourne Money & Finance Conference, July 
2016); ASIC, Further Measures to Facilitate Innovation in Financial Services (Consultation Paper No. 
260, June 2016).   
 51  Feedback Statement, Financial Conduct Authority, Call for Input on Supporting the Development 
and Adopters of RegTech 3 (2016) (emphasis added). 
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RegTech.52 RegTech represents more than just an efficiency tool and rather 
is a pivotal change leading to a paradigm shift in regulation. Viewed 
holistically, RegTech represents the next logical evolution of financial 
services regulation and should develop into a foundational base underpinning 
the entire financial services sector. 
In the near future, the application of technology to monitoring and 
compliance offers massive cost savings to established financial companies 
and potentially massive opportunities to emerging FinTech start-ups, IT 
firms, and advisory firms.53 From a regulator’s perspective, RegTech enables 
the prospect of continuous monitoring that would improve efficiency by both 
liberating excess regulatory capital54 and decreasing the time it takes to 
investigate a firm following a compliance breach.55 RegTech however offers 
more: the potential of continuous monitoring capacity, providing close to 
real-time insights, through deep learning and artificial intelligence (AI) 
filters, into the functioning of the markets nationally and globally. This 
would allow regulators to look forward to identify problems in advance rather 
than simply taking enforcement action after the fact. It is this that so excites 
Andy Haldane, and for which we argue in this paper. Relative to what 
regulators have at their disposal today, this is a profound transformation in 
the approach to both finance and its regulation, and one that would certainly 
meet with the approval of Captain Kirk’s dour engineer, Scotty. 
In the long run, while FinTech is inherently financial in its focus, 
 
 52  Id. For a thorough analysis of the FinTech sector, see Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2. 
 53  Adrian Shedden & Gareth Malna, Supporting the Development and Adoption of RegTech: No 
Better Time for a Call for Input, BURGES SALMON 2 (Jan. 2016), https://www.burges-salmon.com/-
/media/files/publications/open-access/supporting_the_development_and_adoption_of_regtech_no_ 
better_time_for_a_call_for_input.pdf. 
 54  For example, in the case of the new U.S. leverage ratio requirements, banks often complain that 
the requirements would force banks to shed liquid assets that would otherwise be needed to maintain the 
LCR requirements. In the words of Citigroup’s comment letter on the August 20, 2013 joint agency notice 
of proposed rulemaking entitled Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary 
Leverage Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and Their Subsidiary Insured Depository 
Institutions, “[t]he interaction of different leverage, capital, liquidity, debt and wholesale funding-related 
requirements is not well-understood, but in fact may lead to incentives that increase risk in this system, as 
banks seek to ‘optimize’ their balance sheet structure across these different requirements.” Comment 
Letter from Citigroup, Comment Letter on Regulatory Capital Rules: Enhanced Supplementary Leverage 
Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and Their Subsidiary Insured Depository 
Institution, 3 (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/ 
2013/October/20131030/R-1460/R-1460_102113_111420_579523237031_1.pdf.  Similarly, banks and 
trade associations also pointed out that the Net Stable Funding Ratio and its short-term counterpart, the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio, under the U.S. Basel III regime impose unnecessary costs on banks by 
“penalizing” securities trading activities. See John Heltman, Long-Term Liquidity Plan Is Costly and 
Redundant, Banks Argue, AMERICAN BANKER (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/ 
law-regulation/long-term-liquidity-plan-is-costly-and-redundant-banks-argue-1090708-1.html.  
 55  Daniel Gutierrez, Big Data for Finance – Security and Regulatory Compliance Considerations, 
INSIDE BIG DATA (Oct. 20, 2014), http://insidebigdata.com/2014/10/20/big-data-finance-security-
regulatory-compliance-considerations/. 
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RegTech has the potential for application in a wide range of contexts from 
monitoring corporations for environmental compliance to monitoring 
trucking companies for speeding infractions to tracking the global location 
of airliners on a real-time basis. As our financial system moves from one 
based on Know-Your-Customer principles to one based on a Know-Your-
Data approach, an entirely new regulatory paradigm that will have to deal 
with everything from digital identity to data sovereignty, and that will extend 
far beyond the financial sphere, likewise must evolve. 
It is therefore critical to distinguish RegTech from FinTech. The 
conception that RegTech is a subset of FinTech may come from the fact that 
the GFC served to catalyze both developments. However, their underlying 
causes were different. 
The emergence of RegTech is attributable to: (1) postcrisis regulation 
changes requiring massive additional data disclosure from supervised 
entities;56 (2) developments in data science (for instance AI and deep 
learning) that allow the structuring of unstructured data;57 (3) economic 
incentives for participants to minimize rapidly rising compliance costs; and 
(4) regulators’ efforts to enhance the efficiency of supervisory tools to foster 
competition and uphold their mandates of financial stability (both macro and 
micro) and market integrity.58 
The emergence of FinTech is attributable to: (1) financial market 
deficiencies caused by the GFC and the regulatory response to it; (2) public 
distrust in the financial services industry, particularly in the United States 
and EU; (3) political pressure for alternative sources of finance for small and 
medium enterprises; (4) unemployed financial professionals looking to apply 
their talents; and (5) the commoditization of technology and the market 
penetration of the internet and mobile phones, particularly smart phones.59 
From a market dynamic perspective, FinTech since 2008 has grown 
organically as a bottom-up movement led by start-ups and IT firms, whilst 
RegTech has grown mainly in response to top-down institutional demand. 
RegTech can therefore be seen encompassing three distinct, but 
complementary, market sectors and groups of participants. 
Firstly (and most advanced at present) financial institutions and the 
financial industry are increasingly applying technology to meet the demands 
 
 56  See Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 5–8. 
 57  The IIF identified a number of new technologies that could improve data management and analysis 
which include new cryptographic technology, data mining algorithms, machine learning, blockchain, 
robotics, and visual analytics. Id. at 12–14.   
 58  For example, Principle 9 of the BCBS’s “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” 
requires financial supervisors to use an appropriate range of techniques and tools to effectively implement 
the supervisory approach and deploy supervisory resources. This includes a criteria that “[t]he supervisor 
uses a variety of tools to regularly review and assess the safety and soundness of banks and the banking 
system.” BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING 
SUPERVISION 30-31 (2012).  
 59  Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2, at 23. 
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of regulators, especially demands upon large financial institutions in 
developed markets arising from new postcrisis regulations. 
Secondly, regulators, similar to the financial services industry, are faced 
with the need to use technology to address the challenges of monitoring and 
enforcing increasingly demanding regulatory requirements on fast-changing, 
rapidly growing and cross-border markets. In addition, regulators, 
particularly in developing countries and most dramatically in China, are 
facing the challenges of the rapid emergence of new FinTech technologies 
and entrants, all at unprecedented speed. Regulators are faced with the need 
to develop regulatory approaches that do not hinder development and 
innovation while still limiting risks to consumers and financial stability.60 
Thirdly, and to date still at a very nascent level, policy makers and 
regulators will face the challenge of rapidly transforming financial systems 
in coming years, and of building the necessary infrastructure to support their 
regulation, which will necessitate the increasing use of, and reliance on, 
RegTech. This will have to take place in close cooperation with industry 
participants of all sorts. 
As a result of the above, the development of RegTech so far has 
primarily been driven by the financial services industry wishing to decrease 
costs,61 especially in light of the fact that regulatory fines and settlements 
have increased forty-five fold.62 The next stage is likely to be driven by 
regulators seeking to increase their supervisory capacity. We can therefore 
expect RegTech to focus more on business-to-business (B2B) solutions in 
contrast to the FinTech sector in which a large numbers of companies focus 
on business-to-consumer (B2C), as well as B2B, solutions.63 
We begin by considering the most developed space in today’s RegTech 
landscape: traditional financial institutions. 
 III. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: COMPLIANCE AND REGTECH 
Traditional financial institutions, particularly large global banks, have 
 
 60  See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION IN THE 
FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE (2016).   
 61  It was reported that JP Morgan Chase added 13,000 employees at a cost of US$2 billion between 
2012 and 2014. Likewise, Deutsche Bank and UBS spent respectively EUR1.2 billion and US$946 million 
on regulatory demands in 2014. See Institute of International Finance, supra note 4, at 1. 
 62  Piotr Kaminski & Kate Robu, A Best-Practice Model for Bank Compliance, MCKINSEY, Exhibit 1 
(Jan. 2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/a-best-practice-model-for-
bank-compliance. 
 63  For example, the most highly funded FinTech verticals are in the Payment and Financing space, 
which provide direct services to consumers. Furthermore, the rise of challenger banks post-2007 is also 
an expression of the public demand and policy motivation to increase heterogeneity within the retail 
banking sector in the UK. For additional details on the UK Challenger Banking Space, please refer to 
WARREN MEAD, RICHARD IFERENTA & ROBERT HIBBERT, A NEW LANDSCAPE: CHALLENGER BANKING 
ANNUAL RESULT (2016). 
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been the major drivers of the post-2008 evolution of RegTech, stemming 
from their appetite for efficient tools with which to deal with massive new 
and complex regulatory and compliance demands. Financial institutions 
began applying technology intensively to risk management and compliance 
in the 1990s, with regulators placing a high level of trust and reliance on such 
systems. However, the GFC fundamentally altered that paradigm. Since the 
crisis, regulators globally have implemented far reaching and extensive 
regulatory reforms and compliance requirements, which have driven the 
evolution of IT and compliance in major financial institutions worldwide. In 
order to address these challenges, global firms are now developing global 
centralized risk management and compliance functions in order to address 
the changed regulatory and compliance environments.64 
 A. Globalization of Finance and the Development of RegTech 
The history of global financial regulation is in large measure the story 
of regulatory initiatives in response to crisis. For example, the extensive 
financial liberalization and deregulation of the 1970s was followed by the 
Developing Country Debt Crisis of 1982, which in turn provided the impetus 
for the first Basel Accord on capital adequacy in the late 1980s.65 
This was an iterative process of liberalization, followed by crisis, and 
then reactive regulatory responses.66 As markets became more international 
from the late 1960s and increasingly global from the 1980s, domestic 
regulation became increasingly inadequate to address the challenges of cross-
border, international, and global financial markets and institutions. In 
response, a network of cooperative arrangements between policy makers and 
global standard-setting bodies gradually evolved to address new risks arising 
from the internationalization and globalization of finance. This network was 
centered on organizations including the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), the Financial 
Stability Forum, and the Group of Seven (G-7) Industrialized Countries.67 
These organizations, comprised primarily of domestic regulatory agencies 
from major developed financial markets, came together following each major 
crisis (Herstatt in the 1970s, the Developing Country Debt Crisis of the 
1980s, the Mexican and Asian Financial Crises, and the failures of BCCI and 
 
 64  See EY, CENTRALIZED OPERATIONS - THE FUTURE OF OPERATING MODELS FOR RISK, CONTROL 
AND COMPLIANCE FUNCTIONS (2014). 
 65  Capital Standards for Banks: The Evolving Basel Accord (Federal Reserve Bulletin), Sep. 2003. 
 66  For the development of this framework, see Buckley & Arner, supra note 2. 
 67  Lawrence G. Baxter, Understanding the Global in Global Finance and Regulation, in 
RECONCEPTUALIZING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 28-48 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2016); see 
generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 
21ST CENTURY (2011). 
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Barings of the 1990s) to agree on further coordinated regulatory responses to 
prevent similar problems in future. Major examples of such “soft law” 
financial regulatory agreements thus developed include the 1988 Basel 
Capital Accord (Basel I),68 its replacement (Basel II),69 and the FATF’s 40 
Recommendations.70 
From the standpoint of financial institutions, the period from the late 
1960s to the 2008 GFC was one of continual expansion in scope and scale, 
culminating in huge global financial conglomerates.71 This took place 
through organic growth and more significantly through mergers and 
acquisitions, with the merger of Travelers and Citibank to form Citigroup in 
1999 being paradigmatic (as illustrated in Figure 1.0).72 
 
 
Figure 1. Infographic based on information from the Federal Reserve and GAO 
depicting how thirty-seven banks became the “Big Four” between 1990 and 2009. 
 
 68  See BIS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 
(1998). 
 69  See BIS, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL 
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK – COMPREHENSIVE VERSION (2006). 
 70  See FATF, FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 2003); Brummer, supra note 67. 
 71  See Ross P. Buckley, The Changing Nature of Banking and Why It Matters, in 
RECONCEPTUALIZING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 9-27 (Ross Buckley, et al. eds., 2016). 
 72  How 37 Banks in 1990s Became 4 Banks in 2009, Mega Consolidation in US, LET’S TALK 
PAYMENTS, (Jan, 29, 2014), https://letstalkpayments.com/37-banks-1999-2009-became-4-banks-today-
mega-consolidation/ (citing Federal Reserve; GAO). 
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As financial institutions expanded their scope and scale across 
jurisdictions and sectors, they faced increasing operational and regulatory 
challenges. This led to a major expansion of risk management and legal and 
compliance activities, particularly throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Risk 
management from the 1980s was increasingly achieved by using financial 
technology as finance became increasingly quantitative and IT became ever 
more powerful. The combination of quantitative finance and IT was reflected 
in the emergence of financial engineering and Value at Risk (VaR) systems 
in major financial institutions.73 These systems were a major element of the 
transformation of finance prior to the GFC, but also one of the greatest risks 
and failures underlying the crisis itself.74 Put simply, by the early twenty-first 
century, the financial industry—particularly very large global financial 
institutions and their staff, management, and shareholders—had become 
overly confident in the ability to manage and control risks through the 
application of quantitative finance and IT.75 
Regulators too became overly confident in the ability of this quantitative 
IT framework to manage risks, as is demonstrated by the heavy reliance of 
the Basel II Capital Accord on quantitative internal risk management systems 
of major global financial institutions.76 Essentially, regulators outsourced 
major aspects of financial regulation to the largest industry participants and 
their internal risk control mechanisms. 
These two aspects of reliance on quantitative risk management systems 
by industry and regulators could be viewed as the first iteration of RegTech, 
 
 73  See Joe Nocera, Risk Management – What Led to the Financial Meltdown, NY TIMES (Jan. 2, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html. 
 74  The VaR model is unreliable in many ways. See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Seduced by a 
Model, NY TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Oct. 1, 2009), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/ 
seduced-by-a-model/. (“VAR depends on three assumptions that are generally false: not all assets, 
particularly illiquid ones, are included in the VAR calculation; estimates are based on past data that is 
unrepresentative of the future; and because financial returns exhibit ‘fat tails’ (extreme outcomes are more 
likely than you would expect), VAR estimates tell you very little about how bad things can get that last 1 
percent of the time.”). For an empirical study on the limitations of the VaR model, see Andreas Krause, 
Exploring the Limitations of Value at Risk: How Good Is It in Practice?, 4 J. RISK FIN. 19 (2003).   
 75  Overreliance on financial technology such as VaR (estimated through the use of Gaussian copula 
function) that allowed hugely complex risks to be modelled was perhaps what destroyed Wall Street 
according to one commentator. Felix Salmon, The Formula that Killed Wall Street, 9 SIGNIFICANCE 16 
(2012).  
 76  See Harald Benink & George Kaufman, Turmoil Reveals the Inadequacy of Basel II, FIN. TIMES, 
(Feb. 27, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/0e8404a2-e54e-11dc-9334-0000779fd2ac.; Staffs of the 
International Monetary Fund and The World Bank, Implementation of Basel II – Implications for the 
World Bank and the IMF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (July 22, 2005), http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/pp/eng/2005/072205.htm#s2. 
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a sort of RegTech 1.0. Unfortunately, this precrisis partnership between the 
financial industry and its regulators, based on quantitative internal risk 
management systems, provided a false sense of security and confidence77 that 
was shattered by the 2008 GFC. 
 B. RegTech in the Financial Services Industry: Impact of the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis 
To date, traditional financial institutions and their risk management and 
compliance needs have been the primary driver of, and market for, RegTech 
solutions. While the financial services industry has long been a major user of 
automated reporting and compliance tools, increased regulatory costs since 
2008 have enhanced the incentive to shift quickly to adopt digitization and 
automation of processes as the default method of meeting regulatory 
obligations. 
The emergence of RegTech can be largely attributed to the complex, 
fragmented and ever-evolving post-GFC global financial regulatory regime. 
Over-reliance on complex, prescriptive and lengthy post-GFC regulations led 
to massive compliance and supervision costs for the regulated and the 
regulators. Carrying out financial supervision, in response to the growing 
level of regulatory complexity, inevitably required greater granularity, 
precision and frequency in data reporting, aggregation, and analysis.78 
Examples can be easily found in the case of capital and liquidity 
regulations under Basel III, stress testing and risk assessments in the UK, 
United States, EU, and elsewhere, and the reporting requirements imposed 
on OTC derivatives transactions resulting from Group of 20 (G20) and 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) agreed approaches and as implemented (in 
conflicting fashions) in the context of Dodd-Frank or the EU’s EMIR.79 
Compliance costs rose significantly as a result of the increasing regulatory 
burden that made the use of innovative technologies a natural and promising 
solution to compliance requirements.80 As reported by Let’s Talk Payments, 
 
 77  One example is that Basel II’s Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach was perceived to achieve 
two major goals: the enhancement of risk sensitivity, and the promotion of incentive compatibility. 
Nevertheless, in hindsight, the pursuit of risk sensitivity was mostly accomplished by banks pushing assets 
off their balance sheets, leading to a false sense of security.  
 78  Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 5–8. 
 79  Id. at 7. For discussion in the context of the US, see FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 
STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON CAPITAL MARKET 
EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH CARRIED OUT AT THE DIRECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE 
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (March 2016). 
 80  See Eleanor Hill, Is RegTech the Answer to the Rising Cost of Compliance?, FX-MM (June 13, 
2016), http://www.fx-mm.com/50368/fx-mm-magazine/past-issues/june-2016/regtech-rising-cost-
compliance/ (noting that “[a]s rules of thumb go, judging regulatory complexity by the amount of 
paperwork being issued by global regulators is not a bad proxy. Between 2009 and 2014, G20 regulators 
increased their document output by 500%”); Andrew Cornell, AgTech, ResTech, RegTech, FinTech – 
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“[t]he annual spending by financial institutions on compliance is estimated 
to be in excess of US $70 billion.”81 In this situation it is no wonder the 
industry turned to RegTech for cost-effective solutions. 
Second, the deepening regulatory fragmentation displayed in many 
different markets has given rise to an additional layer of compliance burdens 
for financial institutions. Despite the push by global policy makers for similar 
postcrisis reforms, the requirements and rules for implementing these 
reforms range from being slightly different to significantly dissimilar 
between markets. The overlaps and contradictions in regulations led financial 
institutions to turn to RegTech to optimize compliance management.82 
Third, the rapidly evolving nature of the postcrisis regulatory landscape 
introduced uncertainty on future regulatory requirements which put a 
premium on financial institutions enhancing their adaptability in regulatory 
compliance.83 The use of RegTech may have taught financial institutions how 
to ensure compliance in a changing dynamic environment through iterative 
modeling and testing. 
Last but not least, the regulators themselves are becoming motivated to 
explore the use of RegTech to ensure financial institutions comply with 
regulations in a responsive manner.84 The use of RegTech can add value to 
regulators by helping them understand, in closer to real-time, innovative 
products and complex transactions, market manipulation, internal fraud, and 
risks,85 which we discuss in Part IV. 
According to the Spanish international bank BBVA, financial industry 
RegTech focuses on: 
The automation of manual processes and the links between steps in 
analytical/reporting processes, the improvement of data quality, the 
creation of a holistic view of data, the automated analysis of data with 
applications that are able to learn during the process, and the 
generation of meaningful reports that can be sent to regulators and 
 
Actual Solutions or Techno-Babble?, ANZ BLUE NOTES (Feb. 23, 2016), https://bluenotes.anz.com/ 
posts/2016/02/is-regtech-the-answer-to-billions-being-spent-on-compliance-and-reporting/; James 
Eyers, Welcome to the New World of RegTech, FIN. REVIEW (June 20, 2016), http://www.afr.com/ 
technology/welcome-to-the-new-world-of-regtech-20160619-gpmj6k. 
 81  Kate, A Report on Global RegTech: A $100-Billion Opportunity – Market Overview, Analysis of 
Incumbents and Startups, LET’S TALK PAYMENTS (April 18, 2016), https://letstalkpayments.com/a-
report-on-global-regtech-a-100-billion-opportunity-market-overview-analysis-of-incumbents-and-
startups/. 
 82  See Hill, supra note 80. 
 83  See id. 
 84  In fact, some financial regulators are keen to embrace innovation in regulatory techniques. See 
Eyers, supra note 80 (observing that Australia’s ASIC chairman, Greg Medcraft, says “ASIC has been 
thinking about regtech for several years – since before the term has emerged. ASIC is about to establish 
a dedicated regtech team, and its staff will begin working with researchers.”). 
 85  See Hannah Augur, Regtech: The 2016 Buzzword is Turning Heads, DATACONOMY (May 3, 2016), 
http://dataconomy.com/regtech-the-2016-buzzword-is-turning-heads/. 
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used internally to improve key business decision making.86 
In other words, RegTech embodies technological solutions to improved 
regulatory processes and related compliance. Additionally, new 
technological developments (such as AI and machine learning) allow for new 
forms of market monitoring or reporting processes which were previously 
not possible.87 Indeed, the Bank of England is closely looking at the evolution 
of RegTech, stating that: 
“Firms have started to make progress in response to the limitations of 
existing surveillance solutions, including the use of new technology and 
analytics which go beyond the key-word surveillance and simple statistical 
checks previously used by firms to detect improper trading activity . . .”88 
As noted, this has been driven in the first instance by postcrisis 
regulatory reforms and the demands of regulators, with the application of 
technology the enabling factor. Leading examples include anti-money 
laundering (AML) and know-your-client (KYC) compliance requirements 
and prudential regulatory reporting and stress testing compliance 
requirements. 
 1. AML and KYC 
As previously mentioned, FATF, an organization of developed country 
governments established in 1989 and hosted by the OECD, establishes 
international soft law standards that address money laundering and terrorist 
financing. The 40 Recommendations of the FATF have now been 
implemented into the domestic legal systems of most jurisdictions in the 
international financial system.89 While the FATF does not have a formal 
treaty-based structure, its pronouncements nonetheless have wide impact, 
with noncompliant jurisdictions and financial institutions at risk of having 
their access to major markets such as the United States and EU limited by 
those domestic regulators. In addition to the FATF and its Recommendations, 
the UN is also active in issuing sanctions lists of prohibited or restricted 
countries, firms and individuals.90 Unlike FATF Recommendations, UN 
 
 86  See Santiago Fernandez De Lis et, all., RegTech, the New Magic Word in FinTech, BBVA 
Research 1, 14 (March 2016), https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Banking-
Outlook-Q116_Cap6.pdf. 
 87  See Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 11–14. 
 88  Charles Roxburgh et al., Fair and Effective Market Review: Final Report (June 2015), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femrjun15.pdf (emphasis added). 
 89  FATF, International Standards on Combinating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism & Proliferation: the FAFTA Recommendations, (Feb. 2012), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf.  
 90  UN Counter-Terrorism Implantation Task Force, Tackling the Financing of Terrorism, United 
Nations 1, 3, 9 (Oct. 2009), http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_financing_eng_final.pdf. See 
also Id. at 19. (“Under Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) and its successors, the Security Council 
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sanctions lists do in fact have a formal international legal basis. 
The impact of both FATF rules and UN sanctions on the operations of 
financial institutions around the world has been dramatic, with AML 
operations within large financial institutions often forming a major division 
tasked with implementing AML rules and the sanctions imposed by the 
various jurisdictions in which the institution operates, particularly those of 
its home jurisdiction and of the United States (given the primacy of the U.S. 
dollar in international transactions and U.S. activism in enforcement). In 
addition to operations of individual financial institutions, infrastructure 
providers such as SWIFT and CLS are important implementers of AML and 
sanctions.91 
Despite the 40 Recommendations being an internationally agreed, 
harmonized standard, they must still be implemented in the domestic legal 
systems of individual jurisdictions. The result is that although the standards 
are common, the details of their implementation from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction may vary. Within individual jurisdictions there may even be 
differential implementation across regulatory authorities (for example, the 
banking regulator and the securities regulator may have slightly different 
requirements in implementing an internationally agreed standard). 
From the standpoint of compliance, a number of issues arise. 
First, every client or potential client of a financial institution must be 
reviewed under the central element of the AML requirements, that of 
knowing one’s customer. This is an intensive process that requires 
documentation of identity, income, source of funds, and the like, at a deeper 
than surface level. For a large financial institution with operations in multiple 
countries with thousands of customers, this is a demanding process that is 
generally established and implemented through the firm’s internal IT, risk 
management, and compliance systems.92 
Second, because of differences between the requirements of individual 
jurisdictions, firms operating across multiple markets have to implement 
systems (usually IT-based) that address not only the general global 
requirements, but also the specific requirements of individual markets, and 
in some cases of individual regulatory authorities within those markets.93 
Third, the United States in particular has been very active, especially 
post-9/11, in enforcing its rules on not only U.S. financial institutions but 
also foreign financial institutions with operations in the United States. A 
 
compiles a publicly available list of sanctioned individuals and entities associated with the Taliban, Al-
Qaida, Osama bin Laden.”); Id. at 3 (“targeted financial sanctions against individuals, involving the 
freezing of assets.”). 
 91  For SWIFT’s Financial Crime Compliance framework, see relevant materials at 
https://www.swift.com/our-solutions/compliance-and-shared-services/financial-crime-compliance/ 
about-compliance/document-centre. 
 92  See Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 10. 
 93  See id. 
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number of major financial institutions including HSBC, Standard Chartered, 
Barclays and BNP Paribas have been subjected to U.S. regulatory action for 
AML violations, sanctions violations, or both, resulting in large fines from 
U.S. federal and New York state regulators.94 These actions against major 
financial institutions have typically resulted in deferred prosecution 
agreements, one requirement of which is typically the implementation of 
global systems of AML and sanctions compliance meeting US standards 
throughout the entire global operations of the firm. 
Fourth, a core aspect of AML requirements is the reporting of suspicious 
transactions. Such requirements include both subjective elements (for 
instance unusual account behavior) as well as objective elements (e.g. 
reporting of any cash transaction over a certain size, often $10,000).95 The 
investigation and reporting process within a large financial institution is a 
major operation that requires significant resources, both human (at the 
moment) and IT. 
This combination of factors has meant that AML and KYC has been a 
particular focus of RegTech spending and development within major 
financial institutions and in IT and advisory firms and start-ups, such that the 
majority of RegTech solutions to date have focused on KYC compliance.96 
 2. Prudential regulatory reporting and stress testing 
The general features underlying the rapid development of RegTech in 
the AML and KYC context also underpin the development of RegTech in the 
prudential regulatory reporting and stress testing context. 
Like AML and KYC requirements, prudential regulatory reporting 
requirements were a major feature of financial regulation and compliance 
prior to the GFC. These were typically embedded in capital and trading 
reporting requirements.97 While trading reporting requirements primarily 
focused on exchange traded activities and were designed to address issues of 
market conduct (in particular market manipulation and insider trading), 
capital requirements focused on the prudential safety and soundness of the 
individual financial institution.98 
 
 94  See, e.g., Martin Arnold & Sam Fleming, Regulation: Banks Count the Risks and Rewards - 
Crackdown on Money Laundering Threatens to Leave Parts of Developing World Cut Off from Global 
Finance, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/9df378a2-66bb-11e4-91ab-
00144feabdc0.   
 95  FAFTA, Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial Inclusion, 5-
6, 40-41 (Feb. 2013); available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/AML_CFT_ 
Measures_and_Financial_Inclusion_2013.pdf. 
 96  See Paymann, Fintech Companies in Fraud Prevention, KYC and Security, FinTech Valley (Sept. 
28, 2015), https://fintechvalley.org/2015/09/28/fintech-companies-in-fraud-prevention-kyc-and-
security/. 
 97  See Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 6–9, 11. 
 98  See Edward v. Murphy, Who Regulates Whom and How? An Overview of U.S. Financial 
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Capital requirements have been a major focus of cross-border regulatory 
cooperation since the 1980s, when the original Basel I Capital Accord was 
developed in response to insufficient levels of capital in internationally active 
financial institutions after the 1980s Developing Country Debt Crisis.99 
While initially fairly simple, throughout the 1990s Basel I was subject to a 
series of amendments which steadily increased its complexity and related 
compliance costs.100 Of these, the amendments to extend the framework from 
credit risk to market risk and to recognize netting in derivatives contracts 
were probably the most significant, with the former’s use of internal models 
forming an important element of Basel II. 
Basel II, developed in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
was designed to bring together regulatory, economic and accounting capital 
into a single state-of-the-art market friendly framework.101 This reflected the 
consensus view of the reliability of quantitative financial risk management 
systems (despite some evidence to the contrary provided by the rescue of 
LTCM in 1999). Basel II thus extended the internal models-based approach, 
initiated by the Basel I Market Risk Amendment in 1995, to all aspects of 
capital regulation.102 Effectively, financial regulators outsourced the setting 
of capital requirements to large financial institutions themselves. 
Following the GFC, attention has focused on the development of Basel 
III, designed to dramatically increase capital (particularly equity capital), 
reduce leverage, enhance liquidity, and implement systems of crisis 
management for individual institutions, including by limiting reliance on 
firms’ own internal risk modeling systems.103 This is a massive framework 
in its internationally agreed soft law form, and it will be even more 
substantial when implemented in the legal and regulatory systems of 
 
Regulation Policy for Banking and Securities Market, Congressional Research Service 1, 16 (Jan. 30, 
2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43087.pdf. 
 99  Christopher Alessi, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Council on Foreign Relations, 
(July 11, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/banks-and-banking/basel-committee-banking-supervision/p28694. 
(referring to Daniel Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation (2008)); 
Smitha Francis, The Revised Basel Capital Accord: The Logic, Content and Potential Impact for 
Developing Countries (Working Paper No. 09, 2006). 
 100 See Andrew G. Haldane, Exe. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of England, & Vasileios Madouros, Econ., 
Bank of England, The Dog and The Frisbee, Bank of Int’ Settlement,1, 6–8 (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf. (Explaining how the “Tower of Basel” gets extremely complex 
and “thicker” from only 30 pages long to at least a 616 page-long accord document). 
 101 Francis, supra note 99. 
 102 See BIS, An International Model-Based Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements (April 
1995). 
 103 In December 2010, the BCBS published the Basel III documents “Basel III: A Global Regulatory 
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems” (a revised version was published in June 
2011) and “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring” (a revised version was published in January 2013). The term “Basel III” basically means the 
regulatory structure and standards set forth by these documents. For a clear and comprehensive summary 
of Basel III, see ACCENTURE, BASEL III HANDBOOK (2010). 
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individual jurisdictions. 
As with AML, prudential regulation requires global institutions to 
understand, monitor and report all aspects of their activities to regulators in 
the jurisdictions in which they operate. These requirements continue to 
multiply, with daily reporting of thousands of data points to multiple 
regulators in different jurisdictions now being the norm for a large, 
internationally active bank.104 Such requirements mean that financial 
institutions have to be able to produce the necessary data at the required 
frequency in the form required by each individual regulator. While the 
overall approaches may be harmonized, the details frequently are not.105 
Development of significant compliance teams and IT systems to implement 
these requirements has thus been a major focus since 2008, with continual 
evolution of requirements as each stage of the G20/FSB reforms are agreed 
and implemented in individual jurisdictions. 
Unlike the situation pre-crisis, regulators no longer rely on the internal 
risk management systems of individual financial institutions to produce 
appropriate levels of capital for economic, regulatory and accounting 
purposes, but instead have established complex rules to set capital, leverage, 
and liquidity at levels sufficient to protect financial stability, all backed up 
with periodic reviews and “stress tests.”106 These changes have increased the 
demand for RegTech solutions for the financial industry. 
As we argue in this Part, these regulatory requirements also necessitate 
the ever-increasing application of technology by regulators in order to 
monitor the rivers of data being sent to them. All this demand for RegTech 
solutions is providing opportunities for established advisory and technology 
firms as well as start-ups. 
 C. RegTech: A FinTech Opportunity 
In addition to regulatory factors, RegTech is also being driven by 
FinTech developments. Examples include:107 
 
 
 104 See generally, Deloitte, Forward Look: Top Regulatory Trends for 2016 in Banking 1, 9 (2015), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/finance/us-outlooks-top-regulatory-
trends-for-2016-in-banking-reg.PDF. 
 105 This is probably the reason that some private sector standards promoters, such as ISO and the IIF, 
call for data standardization and definition harmonization. See Institute of International Finance, supra 
note 3, at 10. 
 106 See e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM & FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, REGULATORY CAPITAL 
RULES: REGULATORY CAPITAL, IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL III, MINIMUM REGULATORY CAPITAL 
RATIOS, CAPITAL ADEQUACY, TRANSITION PROVISIONS, AND PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION (2012). 
 107 See Chappuis Halder & Co., FCA – RegTech: Call for Input: Supporting the Development and 
Adoption of RegTech 12 (Jan. 2016), http://www.slideshare.net/NicolasHeguy/chco-supporting-the-
development-and-adoption-of-regtech. 
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• AML and KYC requirements. AML and KYC requirements 
established by the FATF and the Basel Committee and implemented by 
domestic regulators around the world have been a driving force in the 
demand for RegTech solutions, in particular for technology to simplify 
and automate processes across the firm and to ensure compliance with 
applicable rules around the world, including suspicious transaction 
identification and reporting.108 An increasing range of IT firms, advisory 
firms, and start-ups are involved, with clear opportunities for future 
development. 
 
• Reporting and data submission framework (e.g. Basel III, Dodd-
Frank).109 As noted above, postcrisis regulatory changes have 
dramatically increased financial industry reporting requirements, 
particularly for large financial institutions. A key aspect of financial 
institution RegTech involves building strategic platforms to aggregate 
all the data needed to comply with stress testing requirements. At a more 
advanced level, there is an opportunity for both established institutions 
and start-ups to provide near real-time data analysis and customized 
reporting. 
 
• Capital assessment and Stress testing (CCAR, AQR).110 In addition 
to reporting requirements, capital requirements and related stress testing 
emerging from postcrisis reforms are major drivers of RegTech in the 
financial industry. Advanced analytics capabilities can be used to design 
models and evaluate how thousands of variables impact financial 
institutions. 
 
• Trading book risk management (Volcker, MiFID).111 New 
regulations addressing trading have added complexity to the compliance 
requirements of global firms, particularly those facing different 
requirements in different jurisdictions. Algorithms can control the 
margin requirements for each transaction and manage the market risk of 
traders’ portfolios. 
 
Clearly, we are still at a fairly early stage in this process, but its 
evolution is developing rapidly. 
 D. Looking Forward: Shared Services Utility and Global 
 
 108 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision mainly promotes the implementation of AML and 
CFT standards through issuing guidelines. BASEL COMM’ ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SOUND 
MANAGEMENT OF RISKS RELATED TO MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING OF TERRORISM (2016). 
 109 See International Institute of Finance, supra note 3, at 6–8. 
 110 See id. at 8–9. 
 111 See id. at 11. 
DOC2 (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/17  1:12 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 37:371 (2017) 
396 
Compliance 
In 2014, Goldman Sachs broke ground on a new campus in Bangalore 
(Bengaluru), India, with capacity for 9,000 staff.112 Bangalore is already 
Goldman’s second largest office (with approximately 6,000 staff, compared 
to 12,000 in New York). Other major financial institutions, including JP 
Morgan, Citibank, Morgan Stanley, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and 
Standard Chartered, among others, have large proportions of their staff in 
centralized support operations in India, especially in Bangalore, Mumbai, 
New Delhi, and Chennai. These are no longer primarily traditional back 
offices or call center operations but rather are increasingly focused on 
integrated global risk management and regulatory compliance. For instance, 
in the context of customer on-boarding, account opening, and KYC 
operations, these functions may be centralized in India (or elsewhere) for the 
entire operations of a global financial services firm.113 
Likewise, in the context of the extensive reporting requirements of 
prudential regulators around the world, particularly resulting from postcrisis 
reforms, financial institutions now look to centralized operations to gather 
the necessary data globally on a real-time basis so that, in the first instance, 
the institution and its management has a much clearer picture of operations 
and risks, and in the second instance, so that the information can be 
repackaged as necessary to meet the requirements of regulators around the 
world.114 Ironically, these operations look a great deal like pre-2008 trading 
floors, with rows of desks with telephones and multiple screens to allow 
continuous monitoring and communication across the institution. 
From a regulatory standpoint, these operations are interesting: 
generally, they are separately incorporated subsidiaries and are not regulated 
as banks in their host jurisdiction, as they are not conducting “banking” 
activities requiring licensing and regulation. Rather, they are often subject to 
the domestic outsourcing rules of the jurisdictions of the group entities for 
which they provide support.115 
The result is the emergence of an entirely different way of addressing 
compliance, one driven by technology and regulatory change and comprising 
the most sophisticated level of RegTech today, what one could call the first 
element of a new postcrisis RegTech 2.0. From this it should be clear that the 
 
 112 See Goldman Sachs to Invest Rs 1,200 Crore in Bangalore, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Sep. 25, 2014), 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Goldman-Sachs-to-invest-Rs-1200-crore-in-
Bangalore/articleshow/43383998.cms. 
 113 See BEARING POINT, SURVEY: SHARED SERVICES INDUSTRY SPECIFICS AND TRENDS IN THE 
EUROPEAN FS MARKET 7–10 (2011). 
 114 See EY, CENTRALIZED OPERATIONS - THE FUTURE OF OPERATING MODELS FOR RISK, CONTROL 
AND COMPLIANCE FUNCTIONS (2014). 
 115 For a summary of the regulatory issues concerned with shared services, see DELOITTE, SHARED 
SERVICES HANDBOOK: HIT THE ROAD (2011). 
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increasing prevalence of RegTech in industry requires regulators to adapt and 
adopt technology within their own internal processes, which comprises the 
second element of postcrisis RegTech 2.0 and is the subject of Part IV. 
 IV. REGULATORS: COPING WITH COMPLIANCE 
The common view is that regulators are under-resourced in terms of 
human capital and budgets, especially when it comes to acquiring and 
implementing technology. While as a general proposition this is almost 
certainly true and one of the main barriers to the development of RegTech 
within the regulatory community (and particularly in the context of 
developing countries), regulators have had some notable successes in the 
context of technology and regulation.116 
It is certain, however, that relative to the private sector there has been a 
lag in regulator adoption of RegTech. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that 
large market incidents have prompted regulatory (re)action. In particular, 
regulators have actively used technology since the 1980s to monitor and 
enforce market integrity in exchange traded securities markets, with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) providing the global lead.117 In 
addition, as discussed in Part III, regulators and the financial industry have 
long worked closely in the evolution of robust technological and regulatory 
solutions to issues regarding cross-border electronic payment systems as well 
as securities trading and settlement systems. However, with the rapidly 
growing amount of information reported to regulators and new technology 
such as AI and deep learning, there seems to be great potential for more to 
be done in terms of automating market supervision, consumer protection, and 
prudential regulation.118 In addition, regulators are being challenged by the 
pace of FinTech innovation, with this challenge being particularly acute in 
developing countries. 
 A. RegTech:  A Regulator’s Tool for the Twenty-First Century 
The evolution of RegTech in the financial industry discussed in Part III, 
particularly RegTech developed by large global financial institutions and 
infrastructure providers such as payment systems, securities exchanges, and 
 
 116 We can observe this from the perspective of how technology changes and impacts the exercise of 
regulatory supervision and oversight in the field of securities regulation. Chris Brummer, Disruptive 
Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977 (2015). 
 117 See, e.g., SEC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES 
ON THE SECURITIES MARKETS (1997); see also TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, 
REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY 
AND EFFICIENCY (2011) (providing an overview of the major movements the SEC has led in regulation). 
 118 See Maryam M. Najafabadi et al., Deep Learning Applications and Challenges in Big Data 
Analytics, 2 J. BIG DATA 1 (2015). 
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clearing and settlement systems, highlights the rate of change within the 
industry itself. However, the regulators themselves provide an example of 
the gap between IT-enabled systems in the industry and the lack of IT-
enabled solutions among regulators. This gap, now quite wide, is one 
regulators are beginning to become increasingly aware of due to the simple 
necessity of dealing with the masses of reports and data that post-GFC 
regulatory changes have required industry to deliver to them.119 Given that 
these data streams are designed to ensure financial stability and market 
integrity, it is essential for regulators to develop systems to appropriately 
monitor and analyze these regulatory datasets. 
 B. Big Data: Matching Reporting with Analytical Tools 
AML and KYC has so far provided one of the most fertile areas for the 
development of RegTech in the financial services industry in the postcrisis 
period.120 However, the information being produced by the financial services 
industry (particularly suspicious transactions reports) provides an example of 
an area where regulators are beginning to consider technological solutions to 
assist in monitoring and analysis and one where failure to do so would in fact 
largely defeat the intended regulatory objectives. 
Failure by regulators to develop the IT capabilities to use the data 
provided in response to reporting requirements would severely impact the 
achievement of the policy objectives of such reporting requirements.121 This 
also provides an important opportunity for collaboration between regulators 
and academia (particularly quantitative finance and economics academics 
who have highly developed capabilities in analyzing datasets and a constant 
hunger for new datasets to analyze). Such collaboration offers great potential 
benefit to regulators and academics in supporting financial stability, market 
integrity, and a greater understanding of market behavior and dynamics.122 
 
 119 For example, the UK Government Office of Science has acknowledged that “[a]t a time when 
institutions are asked to provide unprecedented quantities of data, there remains doubt about the 
regulators’ ability to measure risk and use such risk measurements in determining prudential regulatory 
regimes. This doubt is understandable, as much of recent prudential regulation has been designed and 
implemented in a constrained period of time, yet addresses complicated and evolving problems such as 
systemic risk measurement.” UK GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, FIN TECH FUTURES - THE UK AS A WORLD 
LEADER IN FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES 48 (Mar. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413095/gs-15-3-fintech-futures.pdf. 
 120 To the extent that KYC is to RegTech what P2P was to FinTech: an immediately relatable 
posterchild. 
 121 Ravi Kalakota, RegTech – Regulatory/Risk Data Management, AML, and KYC Analytics, 
PRACTICAL ANALYTICS (Jan. 17, 2013), https://practicalanalytics.co/2013/01/17/data-management-aml-
and-kyc-analytics/; see also KPMG, TEN KEY REGULATORY CHALLENGES FACING THE BANKING & 
CAPITAL MARKETS INDUSTRY IN 2016 2 (2015). 
 122 Such collaboration among regulators, academia and businesses has also been highlighted in the 
FinTech Report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser. See UK GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, 
supra note 119, at 52. 
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An area where regulators have been successful in using technology to 
monitor and analyze markets over the past twenty years is in reporting of 
transactions in public securities markets. Today, regulators rely heavily on 
the trade reporting systems of securities exchanges to detect unusual behavior 
which can serve as a trigger for further analysis and potential regulatory 
investigation and enforcement;123 for instance, trading on inside information 
in advance of a major corporate event, such as a merger or acquisition. 
Securities exchanges maintain data on all trades so it is a simple matter to 
review trading activity prior to an announcement of a merger or acquisition 
to look for unusual trading activity. Such activity is then investigated for 
possible misconduct, which if indicated may form the basis of an 
enforcement action. Such systems provide an excellent example of RegTech 
1.0 in the precrisis period. 
Since the GFC, such systems have been shown to be limited by their 
lack of information on activities taking place off the exchanges. This is a 
clear concern given that the majority of trading in many major securities 
markets now takes place off-exchange via Electronic Communication 
Networks (ECNs) and “dark pools.”124 Regulatory changes in the United 
States and EU are set to change this by mandating reporting of all transactions 
in listed securities, whether or not those transactions take place via a formal 
exchange or an off-exchange electronic system. Such reporting requirements 
must likewise be matched with IT systems within regulators themselves to 
monitor and analyze information presented. 
This is the approach regulators must apply across their regulatory roles. 
This is the second element of an emerging RegTech 2.0. We argue however 
that it is necessary to move beyond this level and to develop a new approach. 
 C. Cybersecurity 
The question of cybersecurity in finance highlights the necessity of 
further regulatory development.125 In particular, the digital transformation of 
finance (the FinTech process) has made the industry far more vulnerable to 
attack. Indeed, as the financial services industry continues to evolve into a 
digitized data-based industry, there is an increasing risk of attack, theft, and 
fraud from hackers (and other cybercriminal activity). The 2016 Bangladesh 
central bank heist, implemented via SWIFT, has shown the vulnerabilities of 
existing frameworks, with the recent Yahoo hack providing further evidence 
of the potential risks. 
Likewise, the 2008 GFC highlighted the public good and public order 
 
 123 THE BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE 
MARKET SURVEILLANCE ISSUES AND REGULATORY TOOLS: CONSULTATION REPORT 14–15 (2012). 
 124 Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Shedding Light on Dark Pools, S.E.C. (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/shedding-light-on-dark-pools.html#_edn5. 
 125 See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, FSOC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016). 
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role of the financial sector, so that the financial sector and financial stability 
are not only economic issues but also national security issues. 
Not surprisingly, this is an area of focus for regulators and one 
increasingly at the center of international attention from organizations such 
as the FSB and Basel Committee.126 This is in addition to the very natural 
attention placed on the issue by financial institutions themselves: 
cybersecurity is one of the most significant risks faced by the financial 
industry, particularly as the digitization and centralization of processes 
continues.127 Likewise for new FinTech start-ups, cybersecurity should be a 
key concern as these data intensive companies often have a limited 
comprehension or perceived need of security as they live in a digital world 
with an abundance of data. Whilst money has scarcity, which drove the 
development of secure vaults and payment systems, data abundance may not 
create the right incentive for firms (beyond reputation risks) and can clearly 
harm consumers. 
Cybersecurity is thus the clearest example of how FinTech demands 
RegTech. However, the area with perhaps the greatest potential for RegTech 
is macroprudential policy. 
 D. Macroprudential Policy 
Prior to the GFC, the focus of prudential and financial stability 
regulation was very much on the safety and soundness of individual financial 
institutions, particularly banks. This was premised on the idea that if each 
individual bank was financially safe and sound, then the financial system as 
a whole would likewise be stable. The GFC fundamentally altered this view, 
and since 2008, there has been a new focus on macroprudential policy, with 
the G20 tasking the IMF, FSB, and BIS to focus on the development of 
related early warning systems to prevent the build-up of risks that lead to 
financial crises, with the overall intention, whenever possible, to prevent 
crises from happening (or at the least minimize their severity). 
Macroprudential policy focuses on the stability of the entire financial system, 
based on a holistic analysis and focusing on interconnections and evolution 
over time.128 
As a result of this new focus, an increasing number of jurisdictions have 
implemented new institutional frameworks to support macroprudential 
policy, including the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the 
United States and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the EU. 
 
 126 See, e.g., THE BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, CYBER SECURITY IN SECURITIES 
MARKETS – AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2016). 
 127 See Sarah Dahlgren, The Importance of Addressing Cybersecurity Risks in the Financial Sector, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK (March 24, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/ 
speeches/2015/dah150324. 
 128 See IMF ET AL., ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY (2016). 
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These new institutional frameworks have been tasked, along with the IMF, 
FSB, and BIS, to seek to develop and implement macroprudential policies to 
prevent financial crises and support financial stability. Macroprudential 
policy thus seeks to use the massive amounts of data being reported to 
regulators in order to identify patterns and reduce the severity of the financial 
cycle. 
This process however is proving challenging. Nonetheless, some 
progress is being made in identifying potential leading indicators for future 
financial instability.129 The progress to date involves quantitative analysis of 
large volumes of data searching for interconnections and implications. The 
massive amounts of data being reported by financial institutions and financial 
infrastructure providers around the world is providing an ever increasing 
volume of data of ever-increasing forms which can feed into these analytical 
processes. Already, major central banks such as the Federal Reserve, the 
European Central Bank and the Bank of England are beginning to use data 
“heat maps” to highlight potential issues arising from automated analyses of 
the masses of daily and other data (such as stress tests) being produced by 
the financial services industry.130 
While these efforts remain at an early stage, they do highlight the likely 
future direction of RegTech in the area of macroprudential policy. At the 
same time, as a result of the process of analysis, regulators are continually 
identifying needs for yet more data.131 This results in ever increasing 
reporting requirements for financial institutions, further driving the need for 
RegTech processes and the necessity of centralized support services to 
collect and produce the required data at the required frequency and in the 
required format. In particular, the Basel Committee (in the so-called BCBS 
239) has set requirements for risk data aggregation and reporting which, as 
they are implemented around the world, are driving internal processes in both 
financial institutions and regulators, with an increasing focus on near real-
time delivery, with near real-time analysis hoped to follow.132 Significantly, 
the FSB and IMF have identified the need for harmonization of reporting 
templates for systemically important financial institutions in order to make 
analysis of data collected more straightforward.133 
While these are very important developments and show the first steps 
 
 129 Id.; see COMM’ ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., EXPERIENCES WITH THE EX ANTE APPRAISAL OF MACRO-
PRUDENTIAL INSTRUMENTS (2016); BLAISE GADANECZ & KAUSHIK JAYARAM, MACROPRUDENTIAL 
POLICY FRAMEWORKS, INSTRUMENTS AND INDICATORS: A REVIEW (2015). 
 130 See IMF ET AL., supra note 128. 
 131 See FIN. STABILITY BD. & IMF, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND INFORMATION GAPS: SECOND PHASE 
OF THE G-20 DATA GAPS INITIATIVE (DGI-2) – FIRST PROGRESS REPORT (2016). 
 132 BASEL COMM., PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE RISK DATA AGGREGATION AND RISK REPORTING 
(2013). With thanks to Kevin Nixon of KPMG and formerly of the Institute of International Finance for 
this point. 
 133 Id. 
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on the way to better regulation through technology, they highlight the 
challenges for other regulators in terms of expertise, access to technology, 
and financial constraints. They also set the stage for the application of more 
sophisticated big data tools including deep learning and AI. 
 V. FINTECH REQUIRES REGTECH 
Building on the framework of analysis introduced in Part II establishing 
a working definition of RegTech, Parts III and IV have shown that regulators 
relied on the market penetration of technology to promote the development 
of DFS in developing countries and worked with industry participants to 
support development of financial infrastructure and related regulatory tools. 
More recently, policy makers and regulators are focusing attention on areas 
such as cybersecurity and macroprudential policy, highlighting the potential 
for far greater progress in coming years. 
 A. Re-inventing Financial Regulation 
Based on the preceding analysis, the focus of RegTech going forward 
needs to shift away from the efficiency gains it has provided to date and look 
instead to RegTech’s potential as a transformative tool to revolutionize 
financial regulation. Indeed, the speed of FinTech innovation, combined with 
the dramatic progress witnessed in some developing countries, warrants not 
only that RegTech be used to make financial regulation more effective and 
affordable, but also that RegTech be used to reconceptualize and redesign 
financial regulation in line with the transformation of financial market 
infrastructure.134 
As FinTech gradually moves from digitization of money to embrace the 
monetization of data, the regulatory framework for finance will need to be 
rethought so as to cover notions previously unnecessary such as data 
sovereignty and algorithm supervision. At this stage, the sustainable 
development of FinTech will need to be built around a new framework, 
namely RegTech. Doing so will required a sequenced approach. 
First there is the need for a holistic approach that focuses on building 
twenty-first century infrastructure to support market functions. This is most 
clear in the context of SWIFT, with efforts now focusing on developing an 
improved structure to support global payments. On the technological side, 
blockchain may offer the potential to replace the clearing and settlement 
methods devised in the nineteenth century.135 In the context of emerging 
markets, India’s recent introduction of a multilevel strategy to support 
FinTech evolution and innovation broadly shows one very promising 
 
 134 See WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE (2016). 
 135 ACCENTURE, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY: PREPARING FOR CHANGE (2015). 
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example of how RegTech 3.0 could look. 
Second is the challenge of developing appropriate regulatory responses 
to FinTech innovation. This is a core aspect of RegTech 3.0 that has been a 
major challenge for regulators around the world to date and that we have 
discussed previously.136 One group of participants (often from the tech side) 
have argued for a laissez-faire approach, so as first to allow FinTech to grow 
and then, only once it has developed, to put in place regulation.137 In many 
ways, this was China’s approach until 2015. Because of a number of negative 
experiences, since the middle of 2015, China has instead focused on 
implementing a complete regulatory framework for FinTech.138 The 
traditional financial services industry, arguably fearful of competition from 
new entrants unhindered by complex and expensive regulatory and 
compliance requirements, typically argues in favor of similar treatment for 
all. 
In our view, the key is to balance risk and potential innovation by 
working closely to understand industry developments but at the same time 
making sure that similar activities are regulated in similar ways in order to 
protect against regulatory arbitrage.139 Regulatory arbitrage, in particular 
moving activities to unregulated environments to avoid regulatory scrutiny, 
together with excessive reliance on financial institutions’ internal 
quantitative risk management systems, were two of the major underlying 
factors in the 2008 GFC.140 This idea of regulatory arbitrage underlies the 
postcrisis focus on addressing risks of shadow banking. 
At the same time, there should be a multilevel approach which applies 
graduated regulatory requirements to firms based upon their level of risk and 
size. FinTech experience in the past decade (particularly in Africa and China) 
highlights the challenge of speed of development and the potential to move 
from “too small to care” to “too big to fail” (systemically important) in very 
 
 136 Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2; Zhou, Arner & Buckley, supra note 49. 
 137 See, e.g., FinTech Regulation in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT 
(May 10, 2016), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/139380/fintech-
regulation-in-china-hong-kong-and-singapore; Deborah Ralston, Let’s Not Regulate Away the 
Competition Fintech Can Bring, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 6, 2015), https://theconversation.com/lets-
not-regulate-away-the-competition-fintech-can-bring-45496. 
 138 Andrew Meola, China Just Hinted It Could Increase Fintech Regulation, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 
29, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/china-just-hinted-it-could-increase-fintech-regulation-2016-
6/?r=AU&IR=T. 
 139 The G-20 in its recently approved High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion also calls 
for the promotion of an “Enabling and Proportionate Legal and Regulatory Framework” that “ensure[s] 
that similar risks are regulated in a similar manner and that an appropriate risk-based approach to 
supervision is developed.” GLOB. P’SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION, G20 HIGH-LEVEL PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2016). 
 140 See also U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT - FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2011). 
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short periods of time.141 In fact, it is this that has caused the reevaluation of 
regulatory approaches in China.142 This also highlights the necessity of 
monitoring of new developments across the financial system by regulators, 
in order to both understand what is happening and its potential implications. 
At the international level, this is now taking place through the FSB in 
conjunction with the IMF and BIS, in an effort to identify and raise awareness 
of new developments that may quickly arise in other markets.143 
Third, we will consider regulatory sandboxes. These have been a central 
focus in the context of appropriate regulation of FinTech. From our 
perspective, perhaps the greatest potential for the sandbox tool is in the 
context of the evolution of RegTech, through the opportunity they present for 
the testing of new approaches by industry and regulators. 
 B. From KYC to KYD: Changing Regulation Byte by Byte 
From a technological standpoint, the development of RegTech is not a 
major challenge.144 The primary limitation may instead come from the 
regulators’ own ability to handle and process the increased amount of data 
generated through technology.145 The UK FCA seems cognizant of this fact 
as it is currently controlling access to its regulatory sandbox to a limited 
number of applicants with a detailed testing plan.146 As a result, there needs 
to be a coordinated approach by financial regulators to support the 
development of RegTech. Harmonization of financial markets and 
regulations has a long history, and harmonization seems increasingly 
important given the mobility of new FinTech start-ups. Furthermore, in the 
context of the UK, lack of harmonization within the EU prevents the 
complete development of regulatory sandboxes.147 
In the UK, the Blackett report has proposed a methodology to favor 




 141 Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2. 
 142 Zhou, Arner & Buckley, supra note 49. 
 143 See Huw Jones, Global Regulators Move Closer to Regulating Fintech, REUTERS (March 31, 
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-g20-regulations-fintech-idUSKCN0WX21J. 
 144 See UK GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER, supra note 119, at 53. 
 145 Id. at 48. 
 146 This includes: test durations, key milestones, risk analysis, investigation of potential exposure, 
measurement metrics and exit strategy. For more details, refer to Andrew Moyle & Fiona Maclean, World-
First Regulatory Sandbox Open for Play in the UK, LATHAM & WATKINS 1 (May 2016), 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-world-first-regulatory-sandbox-open-for-play-in-UK. 
 147 There is even a current discussion on developing an EU-wide regulatory sandbox. See William 
Shaw, EU Weighs Cross-Border Financial Regulatory Sandbox, LAW360 (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/840834/eu-weighs-cross-border-financial-regulatory-sandbox. 
 148 See UK GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER, supra note 119, at 49. 
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• Regulatory policy modelling: emerging techniques such as agent-
based modelling could be used to simulate the likely impact of new 
policies before enactment and the practical impact of existing 
regulation, including conflicts between regulators. Economic analysis 
of the impact of regulation has been an important trend since the Reagan 
administration in the United States and has increasingly been adopted 
by other jurisdictions, including the EU as well as at the international 
level through quantitative impact studies from the FSB, BIS, and Basel 
Committee. The result has been the necessity of the creation of 
economic analysis capabilities in regulatory agencies in order to 
produce the required reports. The U.S. SEC’s Department of Economic 
Risk Analysis is one such example. 
 
• Reporting standards: developing common compliance tagging and 
reporting standards across multiple jurisdictions could support calls for 
the mandatory sharing of information between regulators with 
overlapping jurisdictions. This is being discussed in the context of the 
G-20, FSB, and IMF Data Gaps Initiative in particular and would have 
the potential to reduce reporting challenges for major financial 
institutions and potentially provide better data to support 
macroprudential analysis. 
 
• Systemic risk tools: encouraging the academic community to develop 
a range of mathematical techniques to assess risk has the potential to 
yield important tools for regulators. This process is at early stages, with 
increasing cooperation between major central banks and academics, but 
has much greater potential for development going forward. 
 
• Harmonization: the integration of national, European, and global 
financial monitoring systems could be beneficial. Institutions are faced 
with varied regulatory demands across jurisdictions. Standardized and 
harmonized reporting could therefore be beneficial for both institutions 
and regulators. As highlighted above, this has now been proposed and 
supported by the FSB, IMF, and G-20 as part of the G-20 Data Gaps 
Initiative. Likewise, efforts are progressing in the context of OTC 
derivatives reporting and information sharing. The real challenge 
however remains in its implementation. 
 
• Uniform compliance tools: because compliance is becoming 
increasingly analytical, the regulators might encourage the development 
of a suite of open source compliance tools (which in turn would provide 
an opportunity for FinTech and other financial services start-ups). 
 
• Collaborations and selected data sharing: could be encouraged 
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between different international regulators, for example with respect to 
bad actors within the system. For instance, it would benefit UK 
regulators to know which UK banks are being investigated for bad 
practices in other markets. Another example where there is truly 
transformative potential is in the area of money laundering and KYC 
requirements. A global system of reporting and KYC available to 
participants (both regulators and industry) could transform AML efforts 
and related compliance costs as well as support financial inclusion, as 
highlighted in the ongoing G-20 and FSB focus on correspondent 
banking. 
 
• Regulators collaborate with FinTech: to see what kinds of data are 
being collected and new ways of collecting data, e.g. logging location 
data alongside transaction data. Central banks in major jurisdictions in 
particular have the necessary resources to drive these sorts of 
collaborations, as do international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank in the context of providing 
resources, financial and technical, to developing countries, which will 
face ever increasing challenges to their regulatory and technological 
capabilities as FinTech continues to transform finance. 
 
This provides a framework of steps on an important path that regulators 
are now beginning to follow. 
 C. Building Twenty-First Century Financial Infrastructure 
Looking forward, two examples highlight the sorts of RegTech 3.0 
initiatives which may provide the potential to transform finance. 
This first is the example of blockchain (distributed ledger and related 
technologies) and its use in clearing and settlement (as well as many other 
areas).149 Amongst the most advanced discussions of blockchain is a 
discussion of its potential use in clearing and settlement of securities trades 
in exchange-traded and related environments (such as dark pools and 
ECNs).150 The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and NASDAQ-OMX 
are both engaged in blockchain projects, of which NASDAQ’s is more 
 
 149 The G-20 High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion also encourage worldwide 
regulators to “[c]ollaborate with industry to explore the potential of distributed ledger technology 
[blockchain] to improve the transparency, efficiency, security, and reach of wholesale and retail financial 
infrastructure, allowing for appropriate risk mitigation and safeguards.” GPFI, G20 HIGH-LEVEL 
PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2016). 
 150 Goldman Sachs recently reported that the cash equities market could save US$6 billion if 
blockchain technology were used. See Blockchain Tech Could Save Cash Equities Market $6bn a Year – 
Goldman Sachs, FINEXTRA (May 26, 2016), https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/28955/blockchain-
tech-could-save-cash-equities-market-6bn-a-year—-goldman-sachs. 
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advanced.151 In addition, major financial institutions are progressing with 
development of blockchain-based systems for clearing and settlement of 
foreign exchange transactions, potentially the next level of evolution of the 
long development of regulator and industry efforts to support the efficiency 
and stability of these largest and most global of markets. Finally, efforts are 
underway to develop blockchain systems to address requirements for OTC 
derivatives clearing and settlement, implemented in the wake of the 2008 
crisis.152 Blockchain may also underpin efforts to redevelop SWIFT and 
similar systems. 
Overall, each of these initiatives requires close collaboration between 
industry and regulators in order to be successful and each has the potential to 
greatly improve the functioning of markets and massively reduce costs. 
A second example involves the so-called India Stack. India Stack is an 
idea originated by a group of Indian IT entrepreneurs and supported by the 
government and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) that involves four main 
levels.153 Together, the four levels are intended to provide the basis for a 
FinTech transformation of India’s inefficient financial sector and broaden 
access to financial services across India’s massive population, while at the 
same time opening the market to competition from entrepreneurs, start-ups 
and IT and ecommerce firms. 
At the first level is a national system of biometric identification.154 
Identity is at the base of most financial sector access issues and is a challenge 
across all participants in finance. In India, addressing this has involved the 
creation of biometric national identification cards based on ten fingerprints 
and two retina scans. Such IDs have been issued to over one billion people 
since 2010.155 
At the second level is the establishment of bank accounts as part of the 
process of delivering national services such as pension, health and other 
welfare payments and transfers.156 To date, over 200 million bank accounts 
 
 151 See James Eyers, ASX Builds Blockchain for Australian Equities, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 
22, 2016), http://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/asx-builds-blockchain-for-australian-
equities-20160121-gmbic0.html; Michael del Castillo, Nasdaq Opens Blockchain Services to Global 
Exchange Partners, COINDESK (May 26, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/nasdaqs-blockchain-services-
global-exchange/. 
 152 See Blockchain Technology Will Profoundly Change the Derivatives Industry, BITCOIN MAGAZINE 
(May 27, 2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/blockchain-technology-will-profoundly-change-
the-derivatives-industry-1464368431. 
 153 Abhijit Bose, India’s Fintech Revolution is Primed to Put Banks out of Business, TECHCRUNCH 
(June 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/14/indias-fintech-revolution-is-primed-to-put-banks-
out-of-business/. To learn more about India Stack, visit its official website at http://www.indiastack.org/ 
About-India-Stack. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Press Release, Unique Identification Authority of India, Indian National Identity Program Tops 1 
Billion Enrolees (May 2, 2016), http://www.irisid.com/indian-national-identity-program-tops-one-
billion-enrollees/. 
 156 Bose, supra note 153. 
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have been opened as part of this process, dramatically expanding access to 
the formal financial system.157 
At the third level is a common payment API to enable payments to be 
made by anyone through a common system supported by the RBI.158 
The fourth level involves a series of electronic KYC initiatives which 
allow individuals to maintain details of their financial affairs and to provide 
these details to financial services and other providers in order to meet KYC 
requirements.159 These E-KYC utility platforms show how RegTech can 
improve integrity of financial markets and reduce counterparty risks. 
The combination of these initiatives has arguably set the stage for a 
dramatic transformation of the Indian financial system, similar in scope and 
scale to that which has taken place in China but with a potentially very 
different resulting character. Looking forward, the development of new 
approaches in an environment conducive to testing and experimentation will 
be essential.160 This too is emerging, in the form of regulatory sandboxes. 
 D. Regulatory Sandboxes: A Testing Environment for RegTech 3.0 
Regulatory sandboxes represent a major element of new regulatory 
approaches. The principles of regulatory sandboxes can originally be found 
within the technology sector where a sandbox represents a virtual 
environment to test in isolation a new process or software. However, in the 
financial markets context, a better parallel may be with clinical trials, as the 
sector is similarly regulated to prevent consumer harm while testing new 
innovation. 
This leading example to date comes from the UK. Announced by the 
UK FCA’s Project Innovate Unit, a “regulatory sandbox” is expected to be a 
“safe space in which businesses can test innovative products, services, 
business models and delivery mechanisms without immediately incurring all 
the normal regulatory consequences on engaging in the activity of 
question.”161 The UK has recently commenced its sandbox and there are 
already other jurisdictions (including Australia162, Singapore163, 
 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See CHRIS BRUMMER & DANIEL GORFINE, FINTECH: BUILDING A 21ST-CENTURY REGULATOR’S 
TOOLKIT, 6–11 (Oct. 2014). 
 161 FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, REGULATORY SANDBOX 4 (Nov. 2015). 
 162 Moyle & Maclean, supra note 146. 
 163 See Media Release, Monetary Authority of Singapore, MAS Proposes a ‘Regulatory Sandbox’ for 
FinTech Experiments (June 2016), http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/ 
2016/MAS-Proposes-a-Regulatory-Sandbox-for-FinTech-Experiments.aspx. 
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Switzerland164, Hong Kong165, Thailand166, Abu Dhabi167 and Malaysia168) 
that have expressed their intention to set up similar initiatives. 
The FCA has established a framework of application as well as 
safeguards for the operation of its sandbox. The stated market objectives for 
the sandbox are to: (1) reduce time-to-market at a potentially lower cost; (2) 
provide better access to finance; and (3) foster more innovative products 
reaching the market.169 
The FCA has been exploring a series of options in terms of sandbox 
innovation. These include: (1) Virtual Sandbox, (2) Regulatory Sandbox, and 
(3) Sandbox Umbrella. The access to the sandbox is limited both in the scope 
of applicants and duration. Indeed, as it currently stands, the sandbox will be 
opened in phases,170 and be reserved to participants which are able to 
demonstrate: 
 
• That the Firm falls within the right scope: such that the planned 
new solution is designed to support the financial services industry. 
 
• Genuine Innovation: such that the new solution is novel or 
significantly different to existing offerings. 
 
• Consumer Benefit: such that the innovation offers a good prospect 
of identifiable benefit to consumers.171 
 
• Need for Sandbox: such that the business in fact has a genuine need 
for testing within a sandbox framework. 
 
• Background Research: such that the business has invested 
appropriate resources in developing the new solution, understanding the 
applicable regulations and mitigating the risks. 
 
From a start-up perspective, regulatory sandbox access represents an 
opportunity to operate without complete licensing obligations. To do so, the 
 
 164 See Press Release, FINMA, FINMA Reduces Obstacles to FinTech (Mar. 17, 2016), 
https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2016/03/20160317-mm-fintech/. 
 165 See Hong Kong Regulator to Launch Fintech ‘Sandbox’, THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/hongkong-banks-regulator-idUSH9N18001M. 
 166 See Forming a Fintech Family, BANGKOK POST, (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.bangkokpost.com/ 
business/news/1085544/forming-a-fintech-family. 
 167 See Press Release, Abu Dhabi Global Market, Abu Dhabi Global Market Sets Out Proposal for 
Fintech Regulatory Framework in the UAE, Abu Dhabi Global Market (May 10, 2016). 
 168 See BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA, REGULATORY SANDBOX: DISCUSSION PAPER (July 29, 2016). 
 169 FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra note 161, at 5. 
 170 The first cohort can apply to enter the sandbox between May 9, 2016 and July 8, 2016, and the 
second cohort is due to start in January 2017. 
 171 This criterion is due to be continuously met during the participation in the sandbox. 
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FCA will propose a number of options such as:172 
 
• No enforcement action letter (NAL): Stating that the FCA will not 
take enforcement actions against the testing activities where it is agreed 
that the firm does not breach the requirements or objectives of the FCA. 
 
• Individual Guidance Letter: Provided that the firm’s actions are 
within the guidance issued by the FCA, no enforcement actions will be 
taken against them. 
 
• Waivers: “Where it is clear that testing activities do not meet our 
rules but the firm can meet the waiver test and the rules are within the 
FCA’s power to waive, the FCA can waive or modify particular rules 
for sandbox firms.”173 
 
However, the sandbox needs to uphold the regulators’ mandates and 
particularly that of consumer protection. As a result, the FCA has made it 
clear that in the event that consumers (as opposed to anonymized data) are 
engaged in activities conducted within the sandbox, four different approaches 
are available to be adopted:174 
 
• Approach 1: As in clinical trials, sandbox firms can only test their 
new solutions on customers who have given fully informed consent to 
be included in testing. Customers have to be notified of potential risks 
and the available compensation. 
 
• Approach 2: FCA agrees on a case-by-case basis the disclosure, 
protection and compensation approach for the testing activity. 
 
• Approach 3: Customers should have the same rights as customers 
who engage with other authorised firms (e.g. to complain to the firm 
and then to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), and have access 
to the financial services compensation scheme). 
 
• Approach 4: Businesses undertaking sandbox trials are required to 
compensate any losses (including investment losses) to customers and 
must demonstrate that they have the resources (capital) to do that. 
 
Furthermore, the FCA has also made clear that its ability to allow a firm 
to operate without the traditional licensing regime is subject to EU law 
 
 172 FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra note 161, at 9. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
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Looking forward, such regulatory sandboxes are likely to be one of the 
best ways to support the future development of RegTech 3.0. 
 VI. RECONCEPTUALIZING FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Whilst RegTech 2.0 is largely about streamlining and automating 
regulatory compliance and reporting, it is adapted to rules developed to suit 
a much different technological context than that which is evolving rapidly 
today. Going forward, RegTech 3.0 should be built in a forward-looking 
manner. Regulation is a product of its own history, and market context, 
current technological developments (such as blockchain) and emerging 
market developments (i.e. India Stack) are so fundamentally challenging the 
status quo that reconceptualization of regulation becomes necessary. 
Part V set a potential conceptual framework for RegTech 3.0. It appears 
there is a progressive alignment underway in how FinTech and RegTech are 
evolving, both sharing data-centricity as a common denominator. This 
represents a paradigm shift from a KYC approach towards a KYD (Know-
Your-Data) paradigm, which, while profound, remains a few years away. 
Until then, the design and implementation of proportionate and data-driven 
regulation should enable proactive regulators to handle innovation without 
compromising their mandate. 
As one example, the UK government is seeking to promote the design 
of a regulatory framework able to dynamically adapt to new rules and 
regulations.176 The argument for cost reduction within compliance is very 
strong, and RegTech looks particularly beneficial for firms and regulators 
alike. Indeed, RegTech should enable firms to better control risks and costs, 
and regulators to benefit from more efficient monitoring tools and from 
simulation systems to evaluate the consequences of future legislative 
reforms. 
Yet, balance is needed in assessing what is currently feasible when it 
comes to fully automating regulatory and compliance systems.177 
Furthermore, the RegTech sector will continue to reinvent itself. While post-
2008 regulatory requirements are still evolving, going forward we can expect 
the next financial crisis to add extra layers of requirements and companies 
that develop new business models, in turn generating unexpected risks. The 
legal academic literature would strongly benefit from engaging with what is 
currently being developed within data science and deep learning, in 
particular. 
 
 175 Id. at 8. 
 176 See UK GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER, supra note 119, at 47. 
 177 VYTAUTAS CYRAS & REINHARD RIEDL, FORMULATING THE ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE 
COMPLIANCE PROBLEM (2009). 
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The principles behind regulatory sandboxes can be unbundled and 
enhanced by introducing the concepts of Minimum Regulatory Obligations 
(MRO), while Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs) should be adapted to 
fit start-ups.178 The combination of these two models may resolve current 
deficiencies, moving the sandbox exercise away from its current pilot status 
to a system-wide framework able to nurture innovation in financial markets 
without distorting competition. 
In this context, the emergence of the UK FCA’s Project Innovate 
provides a useful example. The Project Innovate team was built on the back 
of the new banking landscape which aims to introduce competition and new 
banks in the UK.179 This was only made possible by having proportionate 
regulatory capital demanded from new entrants, as well as the design of a 
resolution and recovery plan (RRP). In this way, the RRP concept combined 
with the MRO concept provides a basis for an appropriate way forward in 
the context of regulating new entrants. 
Regulation and regulators may usefully extend the reasoning of RRPs 
to start-ups by contemplating their failure. One example is the introduction 
of a deposit insurance scheme in China, to provide a safety net allowing for 
the potential failure of new banks.180 In other words, market entry for new 
participants could be facilitated for those that have a clear exit strategy in 
case of failure due to internal or external factors. 
In conclusion, this paper illustrates that for the past 50 years the 
application of technology within regulation has changed dramatically. The 
authors have defined the pre-2008 evolution as RegTech 1.0, a paradigm 
severely damaged by the 2008 GFC. Since 2008, the combination of new 
regulatory obligations and technology in the financial industry forms the first 
element of a new RegTech 2.0; the use of technology to facilitate and 
streamline compliance. The second element of RegTech 2.0, involving 
regulators using technology to improve their supervision and regulation, is 
emerging but still at an early stage. 
Looking forward, the truly transformative potential of RegTech is for it 
to be used to re-conceptualize the future of financial regulation by leveraging 
on new technology, and we are beginning to see certain elements of this new 
RegTech 3.0 emerge, with technological progress changing both market 
 
 178 This similarly requires a regulatory mindset shift, as we move from a too-big-to-fail paradigm, 
whereby risk and contagion are sought to be mitigated, to a “small-enough-to-fail” paradigm whereby 
failure is anticipated and planned for from the start. Start-ups are particularly suited for the development 
of RRPs since over 90% of them will fail and their size makes the mapping of their risk (e.g. liquidity, 
market, reputation, technology, etc.) relatively easy given their simpler technological and corporate 
structures. 
 179 Project Innovate and Innovation Hub, UK FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (May 11, 2015), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/project-innovate-innovation-hub. 
 180 Lingling Wei, China to Begin Deposit Insurance in May, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-begin-deposit-insurance-from-may-1427794649. 
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participants and infrastructure, with data as the common denominator. The 
practical consequences of this shift would mean undergoing a transformation 
from a KYC mindset to a KYD approach. The opportunity is to move from 
travelling in an A380 to the Starship Enterprise. The A380 is a splendid 
aircraft, smooth, quiet, capacious and powerful. However, the A380 is only 
an incremental improvement in aeronautical design. The quantum 
improvement is the Starship Enterprise. 
This is where the FinTech revolution is taking us. As our financial 
system moves beyond KYC to KYD we will move into an entirely new 
regulatory paradigm that will have to deal with everything from digital 
identity to data sovereignty and that will have the potential to extend far 
beyond the financial sphere.181 
For regulators, this implies that data security and use will be more 
important than ever before for consumer protection, prudential regulation 
will focus on algorithm compliance, and financial stability will also be 
concerned with financial and information networks. The shift from RegTech 
2.0 to RegTech 3.0 represents a market-wide reform which will need to be 
sequenced. The emergence of FinTech companies, combined with the wider 
use of regulatory sandboxes, offers a unique opportunity to pilot this novel 
kind of regulatory architecture that is proportionate, efficient and data-driven 
before market-wide implementation. FinTech requires RegTech. The 
challenge for regulators globally will be “to boldly go where no man has gone 
before” to conceptualize and implement the possibilities of RegTech. 
 
 
 181 See, e.g., WEF, A BLUEPRINT FOR DIGITAL IDENTITY - THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
BUILDING DIGITAL IDENTITY (Aug. 2016). 
